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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Indian law and the Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter the Code) rarely collide.  
Very few legal scholars with expertise in one area like to spend time in the other one.  
At first glance, it seems as though these two areas of the law seem to have almost 
nothing in common.  Still, American Indian tribes are subject to the provisions of the 
Code, and like other taxpayers, they occasionally have disagreements with the 
Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter IRS) with respect to what the Code says. With 
Federal Indian law entering the equation, the already complicated provisions of the 
Code can become even less clear.  These two areas of law do collide occasionally, 
and the results can cause some head scratching among those familiar with both areas.  
That is exactly what happened in the two cases that are at the center of this Note. 
In a span of three weeks in April, 2000, two U.S. Circuit Courts came to 
completely opposite conclusions with respect to the same factual situations.  In both 
cases, a federally recognized Indian tribe was suing the government for the refund of 
excise taxes paid on the sales of “pull-tab” games, which are commonly sold by 
tribes and non-profit organizations as a means of fundraising.  Both cases brought 
together various statutes from the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act1 (the IGRA) and 
the Code, as well as other treaties and canons of construction. 
The first decision, Chickasaw Nation v. United States,2 decided on April 5th in 
the Tenth Circuit, held that the tribe was not exempt from paying excise taxes on 
these games.3  The second decision, Little Six, Inc. v. United States,4 decided on 
April 24th by the Federal Circuit, held that the tribe was exempt from these excise 
taxes.  These results were contradictory in spite of the fact that the factual situations 
were virtually identical and involved the same statutes.  The complexity of the 
statutes makes the issue a cloudy one and resulted in the contradictory outcomes. 
The Supreme Court has now decided to review the matter.  It granted a petition for 
certiorari in the Chickasaw Nation case,5 but a date for the oral arguments has not yet 
been set. 
This Note will explore the reasons why two identical cases can turn out with 
completely different results.  To do so, consideration will be given to the statutes 
involved and the varying interpretations of these statutes.  Another important 
consideration is the policy behind these statutes, especially the IGRA.  Part II will 
describe what the pull-tab games are, the statutes at issue, the conflicting cases, and 
the statutory interpretation issue.  Part III will describe how the tenets of Indian Law 
can affect the analysis.  Part IV will contain an analysis of the statutes and compare it 
to how the courts analyzed them.  Part IV will also explore how issues and policies 
                                                                
125 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (2000). 
2208 F.3d 871 (10th Cir. 2000). 
3Actually, Chickasaw Nation represents two cases, itself and a companion case, Choctaw 
Nation of Oklahoma v. United States, 210 F.3d 389 (10th Cir. 2000).  Choctaw Nation, which 
again involved the same factual scenario and issues as Chickasaw Nation, was decided on the 
same day by the same panel of judges.  The brief opinion in Choctaw Nation stated that it 
affirmed summary judgment to the government based on its opinion in Chickasaw Nation.  
Chickasaw Nation of Oklahoma, 210 F.3d at 389. 
4210 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
569 U.S.L.W. 46224 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2001) (No. 00-507). 
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more specific to Indian law should be weighed in the analysis of the statute.  Finally, 
the Note will conclude that the decision in Little Six, Inc. is the correct one. 
II.  THE BACKGROUND OF CHICKASAW NATION AND LITTLE SIX 
A.  What Are These “Pull-Tab” Games? 
The pull-tab games that became the center of this controversy are a relatively 
common and simple form of gambling.  Anyone who has been to a church festival or 
a bingo hall has probably seen them all over the place.  The game itself is simply a 
ticket containing four or five windows with tabs on the back of the ticket.6  Players 
pull off the tabs to reveal a combination of symbols.  If the symbols on the back of 
the card match a group of symbols on the front, the player wins a prize.  The concept 
is similar to that of instant scratch-off tickets sold by a number of state lottery 
agencies.  The cards are sold in a series of 24,000 tickets, and the number of winning 
tickets are arranged so that once the entire box is sold, the seller makes a profit.7 
The tribes involved in Chickasaw Nation and Little Six, Inc. sell these games on 
their reservations, including in gaming centers and convenience stores.   Players can 
then redeem their prizes immediately at the point of sale or claim them later.8   
B.  The Statutes Involved 
1.  Internal Revenue Code § 4401 
Section 4401(a) of the Code imposes an excise tax on all types of wagers.  That 
statute reads:   
(1) State authorized wagers – There shall be imposed on any wager authorized 
under the law of the State in which accepted an excise tax equal to 0.25 percent of 
the amount of such wager. 
(2) Unauthorized wagers – There shall be imposed on any such wager not 
described in paragraph (1) an excise tax equal to 2 percent of the amount of such 
wager.9 
However, § 4402(3) grants an exemption from the tax imposed in § 4401 to a 
“state-conducted lottery.”  It states that no tax shall be imposed by this subchapter: 
On any wager placed in a sweepstakes, wagering pool, or lottery which is 
conducted by an agency of a state acting under authority of State law, but 
only if such wager is placed with the State agency conducting such 
sweepstakes, wagering pool, or lottery, or with its authorized employees 
or agents.10 
                                                                
6See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 874 (describing how the pull-tab games work). 
7See id. at 877. 
8See id. 
9I.R.C. § 4401(a) (2000). 
10Id. § 4402(3) (2000). 
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It seems understandable that Congress would want to exempt state lotteries from 
being liable for the excise tax since the profits from these lotteries go to fund public 
projects, such as schools.11 
Additionally, § 4411 imposes an occupational tax on each person who is liable 
for the tax imposed by § 4401.12  The language and other details of the statute are not 
particularly important to the controversies in Chickasaw Nation and Little Six, Inc.; 
the statute just raised the stakes as far as the amount of money involved in the cases. 
Sections 4401, 4402(3), and 4411 are all in Chapter 3513 of the Internal Revenue 
Code, which is entitled “Taxes on Wagering.”  Chapter 35’s reference in 
§ 2719(d)(1) of the IGRA results in confusion because nothing in Chapter 35 
particularly relates to the rest of the language of § 2719(d)(1).  To find out why this 
is the case, it is necessary to look at § 2719(d)(1) of the IGRA. 
2.  The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act14 was enacted by Congress in 1988.  The 
purpose of the IGRA, according to the legislation, was “to promote tribal economic 
development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government.”15  However, 
most commentators at the time agreed that the real purpose of the legislation was to 
quell states’ fear of competition from both regulated and unregulated Indian 
gaming.16  That fear was greatly fueled by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.17   
In fact, the IGRA was enacted largely, if not entirely, as a reaction “to a series of 
federal court decisions, culminating in” Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.18  In 
Cabazon Band, the State of California tried to apply its gambling regulations to tribal 
gaming facilities consisting of bingo halls and card clubs.19  In analyzing the case, 
the Court noted that there is an overall federal interest in “encouraging tribal self-
                                                                
11For example, Article XV, Section 6 of the Ohio Constitution requires that all profits 
from the Ohio Lottery be used to fund public schools.  Other states have similar requirements.  
For example, California requires that 34 percent of total lottery revenues be allocated to the 
benefit of public education.  See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8880.4(a)(2) (West 2000). 
12See I.R.C. § 4411(a) (2000).   
13I.R.C. §§ 4401-24 (2000). 
1425 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21. 
15See 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1).   
16Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Virtue or Vice?  How IGRA Shapes the Politics 
of Native American Gaming, Sovereignty, and Identity, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 381, 400 
(1997). 
17480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
18Rand & Light, supra note 16, at 382. 
19Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. at 204-05.  The dispute arose because the 
bingo and card games operated by the tribe allegedly violated California laws which limited 
prizes and required that profits be kept in special accounts and used for charitable purposes.  
The tribes admitted that the games violated the prize limits but claimed that the state did not 
have the authority to enforce these gambling laws within the reservations.  Id. at 206. 
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sufficiency and economic development,”20 and asserted that the tribes’ interests were 
identical.21  The Court determined that federal and tribal interests pre-empted 
California’s authority to regulate Indian gaming operations.22  Essentially, the Court 
stated that even if a state were to only allow minor forms of gambling within its 
borders, any tribe in that state could conduct any form of gambling, including casino 
games and slot machines, as long as operations were conducted on Indian lands 
under tribal sovereignty.23  Naturally, states were concerned with a lack of control 
over Indian gaming within its borders.  This concern provided the impetus for 
Congress to enact the IGRA.   
The IGRA allocates jurisdictional responsibility for regulating Indian gaming 
according to the types of gaming involved.  The more “high-stakes” the games are, 
the more control states have over their regulation.  The IGRA establishes three 
classes of gaming.  Class I gaming includes gaming associated with traditional 
Indian ceremonies and is subject to exclusive tribal jurisdiction on tribal lands.24  
Class II gaming includes bingo and nonbanking card games, such as poker, that meet 
certain state provisions,25 and are allowed on tribal lands in states that permit such 
types of gaming for any purpose by any person.26  The tribes may regulate Class II 
gaming with oversight from the National Indian Gaming Commission.27  Class III 
gaming includes all types of gaming not included in Class I or Class II.28  These are 
typically the high-stakes casino games such as slot machines, roulette, and blackjack.  
Tribes must have a tribal-state compact in order to operate Class III gaming.29  The 
pull-tab games at issue in these cases were classified as Class II games.30 
The specific provision of the IGRA that became a central issue in Chickasaw 
Nation and Little Six, Inc. is § 2719(d)(1), which requires that the reporting and 
withholding of taxes under certain provisions of the Code should be applied to Indian 
gaming in the same manner as those provisions apply to state gaming operations.  
Section 2719(d)(1) states: 
The provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (including sections 
1441, 3402(q), 6041, and 6050I, and Chapter 35 of such Code) concerning 
the reporting and withholding of taxes with respect to the winnings from 
gaming or wagering operations shall apply to Indian gaming operations 
                                                                
20Id. at 216.   
21Id. at 219. 
22Id. at 221-22. 
23Rand & Light, supra note 16, at 210-14. 
24See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1). 
25Id. § 2703(7)(A). 
26Id. § 2710(b)(1)(A). 
27Id. § 2706(b).  The Commission was established in the IGRA as an agency to administer 
the provisions of the IGRA.  It is in the Department of the Interior.  See id. § 2704. 
2825 U.S.C. § 2703(8). 
29Id. § 2710(d)(1)(C). 
30See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 881; Little Six, Inc., 210 F.3d at 1364. 
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conducted pursuant to this chapter, or under a Tribal-State compact 
entered into under section 2710(d)(3) of this title that is in effect, in the 
same manner as such provisions apply to State gaming and wagering 
operations.31  
The problem is that the statute aims to apply certain provisions of the Code 
concerning “the reporting and withholding of taxes with respect to the winnings from 
gaming or wagering operations” to Indian gaming operations in the same manner as 
those provisions apply to State gaming and wagering operations.32  Those provisions 
are to include some sections referenced in the parenthetical phrase inserted in the 
statute.  However, included in the parenthetical is a reference to Chapter 35 of the 
Code, which is a chapter imposing excise and occupational taxes.  It could be argued 
that Congress meant to apply the taxes imposed in Chapter 35 to the tribes in the 
same manner as they are applied to state gaming operations.  Under that 
interpretation, the tribes would be exempt from the taxes imposed by Chapter 35 
because § 4402(3) exempts state gaming operations from these taxes.33  On the other 
hand, it could be argued that Congress only intended that this statute apply to the 
reporting and withholding requirements of the Code, as the language outside the 
parenthetical in § 2719(d)(1) would indicate.  Under that interpretation, since 
Chapter 35 does not deal with reporting and withholding requirements, it would not 
apply to the tribes in the same manner as it is to the states.  Therefore, the tribes 
would not be exempt from the taxes in Chapter 35.  The parenthetical was probably 
inserted in an effort to make the statute more understandable. However, it did the 
opposite, leading to the confusion which culminated in the disagreements in 
Chickasaw Nation and Little Six, Inc. 
C.  The Cases at the Center of This Controversy 
1.  The Basic Factual Background 
The factual backgrounds for these cases are virtually identical.  Both cases 
involved tribes who were selling the pull-tab games on their reservations.  The 
Chickasaw Nation (the Nation), and presumably Little Six, Inc., though the opinion 
in its case does not mention it, withheld income taxes from the winnings of players 
in accordance with § 3402(q)34 of the Code.  The Nation also filed informational 
returns with the IRS concerning these winnings.35  Neither tribe, however, paid the 
wagering excise taxes under § 4401 or the related occupational tax under § 4411.36  
                                                                
3125 U.S.C. § 2719(d)(1). 
32Id. 
33See I.R.C. § 4402(3). 
34See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 874.  Under § 3402(q)(3)(B) of the Code, a state 
agency conducting a lottery or wagering activity is to withhold an amount equal to 28 percent 
of any payment over $5,000 made to the winner of a state lottery.  The result is that the agency 
(and the IRS) does not need to go to the trouble of processing withholding paperwork for a 
player who has won a small prize.   
35Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 874. 
36See id. 
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The IRS conducted an audit of both tribes and determined that they were both liable 
for these taxes.37  The tribes paid the assessment under protest and filed suit for a 
refund.38 
2.  The First Decision – Chickasaw Nation v. United States 
The Chickasaw Nation is a tribe with its principal place of business in 
Oklahoma.39  The IRS determined that the Nation owed about $45,000 in wagering 
and occupational taxes related to its sales of the pull-tab games for the period from 
August 1991 to August 1994.40  After the government was granted summary 
judgment in the District Court,41 the Nation raised four grounds for appeal:  (1) The 
pull-tabs do not constitute a “taxable wager” under § 4421 of the Code; (2) the tribe 
is not a “person” subject to federal wagering excise taxes; (3) the IGRA 
demonstrated a Congressional intent not to subject Indian gaming to federal 
wagering excise taxes; and (4) “the self-government guarantee of the 1855 treaty 
between the United States and the Nation precludes the imposition of these taxes.”42  
First, the Court had to determine whether the pull-tab games could be considered 
a “lottery” under § 4421(2)(A) of the Code.  That section defines “lottery” as:  
(2)Lottery – The term “lottery” includes the numbers game, policy, and similar 
types of wagering.  The term does not include – 
(A)  Any game of a type in which usually 
(i)  The wagers are placed 
(ii)  The winners are determined, and 
(iii)  The distribution of prizes or other property is made, in the presence of 
all persons placing wagers in such game, and 
(B)  Any drawing conducted by an organization exempt from tax under sections 
501 and 521, if no part of the net proceeds derived from such drawing inures to 
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.43   
The Court noted that the word “includes” in the statutory definition signals an intent 
to include within the definition various types of gaming not specifically mentioned in 
the statute, and then turned to the dictionary definitions of the word “lottery” for 
assistance.44  Black’s Law Dictionary states that the “[e]ssential elements of a lottery 
are consideration, prize and chance and any scheme or device by which a person for 
a consideration is permitted to receive a prize or nothing as may be determined 
predominantly by chance.”45  Using this definition, the Court concluded that the pull-
tab system does constitute a lottery.  The system utilized by the Nation is a scheme 
                                                                
37See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 874; Little Six, Inc., 210 F.3d at 1363. 
38See id. 
39See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 874. 
40See id. 
411998 WL 975690 (E.D. Okla. 1998). 
42See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 875. 
43I.R.C. § 4421(2). 
44See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 876. 
45BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 947 (6th ed. 1990). 
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by which prizes are randomly distributed to the winners who have paid for a chance 
to win them.46  The Court disagreed with the Nation’s argument that each individual 
pull-tab should be viewed as a separate game.  That argument would place the pull-
tabs in the statutory exclusion of § 4421(2) because the wager would be placed when 
the player buys the ticket, the winners would be determined when the player pulls the 
tabs off of the back of the ticket, and the prize would be distributed in the presence 
of all persons placing wagers, as the player would be the only player of that game, so 
the prize would be distributed in his presence.  The Court instead adopted the District 
Court’s conclusion that when each customer purchases a pull-tab, “he is competing 
against every other person who purchases a pull-tab from the same series.”47  This is 
because “the tickets are purchased and resold by the Nation in series of 24,000 
tickets, with a specific number of winning tickets randomly distributed throughout 
the series.”48  Prizes for a particular series “are not awarded all at one time or in the 
same location.”49  Accordingly, the Court found that the pull-tab games are not 
within the statutory exclusion to the definition of “lottery” in § 4421(2). 
The next argument centered on whether the tribe was a “person” subject to the 
taxes imposed by §§ 4401 and 4411.  Section 7701(a)(1) of the Code states that 
“[t]he term ‘person’ shall be construed to mean and include an individual, trust, 
estate, partnership, association, company or corporation.”50  Again, the Court noted 
that because of the use of the word “include” in the definition, Congress did not 
mean for this list to be exhaustive.51  The Court then cited a number of cases that 
concluded that the word “person,” as defined in the Code, encompasses legal entities 
not specifically listed in the statutory definition.52  Based on that reasoning, the court 
concluded that § 7701(a)(1) “unambiguously encompasses all legal entities that are 
the subject of rights and duties and that Indian tribes are such legal entities.”53 
The next argument concerned the purpose stated in the IGRA.54  The Nation 
contended “that the imposition of federal wagering excise taxes and the 
accompanying … occupational taxes on its pull-tab games is contrary to both the 
spirit and letter of the IGRA.”  The Nation argued that a purpose of the Act was to 
“maximize tribal gaming revenues.”55  The Court disagreed, stating that while 
                                                                
46See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 877. 
47Id. 
48Id. 
49Id. 
50I.R.C. § 7701(a)(1) (2000). 
51See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 880. 
52In fact, the Eighth Circuit has specifically held that the word “person” as it is used in §§ 
6421 and 6675 of the Code encompasses Indian tribes.  See Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. 
United States, 197 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 1999). 
53Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 880.   
5425 U.S.C. § 2702, which stated the purpose of the IGRA, included language indicating a 
purpose “to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means 
of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.” 
55See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 881. 
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“Congress was interested in promoting tribal economic development and self-
sufficiency,56 there is no mention of the phrase “maximizing tribal gaming revenues” 
anywhere in the IGRA.57 
Then the Court discussed the language of § 2719(d).  The Nation argued that the 
statute showed Congress’ intent not to apply the Code provisions creating tax 
liability.  This was because § 2719(d)(1) identifies as applicable only a specific type 
of code provision and omits others.58  The Court rejected the argument, first because 
it believed that it was “clear that § 2719(d) does not expressly prohibit the imposition 
of federal wagering or … occupational taxes on Indian gaming operations.”59  The 
statute only provides that Indian gaming operations are required to report and 
withhold certain player winnings in the same manner as state gaming operations.  
Applying the language of the statute to the wagering taxes would be an inference 
from the reference to Chapter 35 made in the parenthetical in § 2719(d)(1), and the 
Court thought that it would be unreasonable to assume that Congress intended to 
create a tax exemption by way of a negative inference in § 2719(d)(1).60   
The Nation finally attempted to persuade the Court that its interpretation of 
§ 2719(d) was correct based on a letter sent by Senator Daniel Inouye, one of the 
authors of the IGRA, to the Commissioner of the IRS.61  His letter stated that 
“Congress intended that the tax treatment of wagers conducted by Tribal 
governments be the same as that for wagers conducted by state governments under 
Chapter 35 of the Internal Revenue Code.”62  Therefore, since wagers conducted by 
state governments are exempted from the taxes by § 4402(3) of the Code,63 the tribes 
should also be exempt.  However, this letter was sent four years after the enactment 
of the statute, and the Court thought that the comments of one senator would have 
little value in interpreting the statute.64  The Court also found that Senator Inouye’s 
interpretation was inconsistent with both the statute’s language and legislative 
history.65  That is because the language of § 2719(d)(1) only speaks to the provisions 
of the Code concerning the reporting and withholding of taxes with respect to the 
winnings from gaming operations.66  Additionally, the Court noted that the original 
language of the bill that became the IGRA included an explicit exemption for Indian 
gaming from the federal wagering tax.  However, this exemption was deleted prior to 
                                                                
56See 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1). 
57See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 881. 
58See id. at 882. 
59Id. 
60Id. at 883. 
61See id. 
62See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 883. 
63See I.R.C. § 4402(3). 
64Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 883. 
65Id. 
66See 25 U.S.C. § 2719(d)(1). 
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the IGRA’s passage.67  Finally, the Court dismissed a claim from the Tribe that its 
treaty with the United States, signed in 1855, provided it with an exemption from the 
taxes at issue.68   
3.  The Second Decision – Little Six, Inc. v. United States 
Little Six, Inc., is actually a wholly owned corporation of the Shakopee 
Mdewakanton Sioux Community, based in South Dakota.69  The audit conducted by 
the IRS resulted in an assessment of nearly $175,000 in wagering and occupational 
taxes.70  Little Six brought suit for a refund of taxes paid after the assessment, and 
the government was awarded summary judgment in the Court of Federal Claims.71  
The line of reasoning in that decision was similar to that in Chickasaw Nation. 
In the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the Little Six, Inc. Court’s 
analysis began with a discussion of whether the pull-tab games were wagers subject 
to taxation in §§ 4401 and 4411.  Little Six argued that these tax provisions only 
applied to wagers authorized under state law, and since their wagers were authorized 
under federal law,72 the provisions did not apply to their pull-tab games.73  However, 
this argument failed because the IGRA authorizes pull-tab games as long as “such 
Indian gaming is located within a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by 
any person, organization, or entity.”74  Because these types of wagers have to be 
authorized by the state in which the wagers take place, the wagers placed under the 
IGRA are state authorized under § 4401 of the Code.75  Then came the discussion of 
§ 2719(d)(1) of the IGRA. 
The analysis began by concluding that § 2719(d)(1) applies Chapter 35 of the 
Code to Indian gaming in the same manner as it does to state gaming, because 
Chapter 35 is mentioned in the parenthetical in the statue.76  Therefore, § 2719(d)(1) 
can be reasonably construed to provide an exemption to the wagering excise tax for 
wagers placed on lotteries and pull-tab games conducted by Indian tribes, because 
the Internal Revenue Code provides such an exemption to state gaming operations in 
§ 4402(3) of the Code.77   
                                                                
67See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 882-83. 
68See id. at 884.  Article VII of that treaty granted certain aspects of self-government to the 
Nation, but the court disagreed with the Nation’s argument that this right of self-government 
could be construed to give rise to an exemption from federal excise taxes.  Id. 
69See Little Six, Inc., 210 F.3d at 1362.   
70See id. at 1363. 
71Little Six, Inc. v. United States, 43 Fed.Cl. 80 (1999). 
72The tribe’s pull-tab wagers are authorized by another part of the IGRA, 25 U.S.C. § 
2703(7)(A)(i), which defines “Class II” gaming to include pull-tabs.  See Little Six, Inc., 210 
F.3d at 1363. 
73See Little Six, Inc., 210 F.3d at 1363. 
74See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1)(A). 
75Little Six, Inc., 210 F.3d at 1364. 
76Id. at 1365. 
77Id. 
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Although it is true that § 2719(d)(1) only applies to those provisions that concern 
“the reporting and withholding of taxes [from] winnings,” the Court noted that in 
construing the statue, it had to give effect and meaning to all of its terms.78  The 
Court then noted that the statute also explicitly refers to § 6050I and Chapter 35 of 
the Code, which clearly do not relate to “winnings.”79  Section 6050I relates to 
informational returns on cash transactions80 and Chapter 35 relates to excise and 
occupational taxes on wagers.81  That, said the Court, would make the interpretation 
proposed by the government superflouous, something which the Court wished to 
avoid.82 
The Court’s analysis concluded that § 2719(d)(1) is ambiguous.83  The Court 
seemed ready to turn to the Indian Canon of Construction to settle the issue in favor 
of Little Six.  Before this could be done, though, the court dealt with the issue of the 
interpretation of tax exemptions.  Normally, tax exemptions are interpreted strictly.  
However, the Supreme Court has noted that when the government is dealing with 
Indians, the rule is the opposite.  Instead of construing the exemption narrowly, it is 
to be construed broadly.84  Therefore, the tribe had both the Indian Canon and the 
Supreme Court’s tax exemption language working in its favor. 
Finally, the Court relied on some of the IGRA’s legislative history to support its 
conclusion.  It noted that according to § 2702 of the IGRA, one of the primary 
purposes of the IGRA was to promote tribal economic development and 
sufficiency.85  The Court also stated that equal treatment of tribes and states with 
respect to exemptions from federal wagering taxes is consistent with legislative 
intent, and in accord with the concept of co-equal sovereignty.86  With that, the Court 
concluded that the pull-tab games were exempt from the wagering taxes, and 
reversed the lower Court.87 
i.  A Quick Note on the Government’s Petition for Rehearing 
The result of Little Six, Inc. had to be a surprise to the government.  Having won 
a case with the same facts only a few weeks before, it was reasonable to expect the 
same result.  But that did not happen, so the government petitioned for a rehearing.  
The petitions for both a rehearing and a rehearing en banc were denied.88 
                                                                
78Id. 
79Id.  
80See I.R.C. § 6050I (2000). 
81See I.R.C. §§ 4401-24. 
82Little Six, Inc., 210 F.3d at 1365. 
83Id. 
84See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985).   
85Little Six, Inc., 210 F.3d at 1366. 
86Id. (The Court cited S. REP. No. 466, at 13 (1988) (“The Committee concluded that the 
compact process is a viable mechanism for setting various matters between two equal 
sovereigns.”)). 
87Id. 
88Little Six, Inc. v. United States, 229 F.3d 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
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Judge Dyk, who was joined by Judges Newman and Plager, wrote a lengthy 
dissent to the denial of the rehearing en banc.  His first criticism was that he thought 
the Little Six, Inc. panel was too fast in finding the statute ambiguous and, therefore, 
resorting to the Indian Canon of Construction.89  He admitted that he did not agree 
with the government’s argument that the reference to Chapter 35 was intended to 
incorporate the definitions of “wagers” and “lotteries” in § 4421.90  This case, he 
believed, presented a situation where it is impossible to give effect to all of the 
statute’s language without rendering the statute self-contradictory.91  Instead of 
resorting to the canon, said Judge Dyk, the Court should have examined the statute’s 
structure, purpose, and history to come up with a coherent interpretation.92   
Judge Dyk could not see how the parenthetical reference to Chapter 35 could be 
used to create the exemption.93  It seemed unlikely to him that Congress would create 
a significant tax exemption through a parenthetical reference, especially when the 
reference is in a sentence which only discusses the reporting and withholding of 
taxes on winnings.94   
He also had a major disagreement with the Little Six, Inc. panel’s interpretation 
of the IGRA’s legislative history.  As the Chickasaw Nation Court noted, early 
versions of § 2719(d)(1) would have exempted tribes from the wagering tax by 
inserting the word “taxation” right before the words “reporting and withholding” in 
the statute.  Therefore, the statute would read:  “Provisions of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954, as amended, concerning the taxation and the reporting and 
withholding of taxes pursuant to the operation of a gambling or wagering operation 
shall apply to the operations in accord with the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act the 
same as they apply to State operations.”95  That language, because it brings the word 
“taxation” into the statute, would clearly result in an exemption from the taxes in § 
4401 of the Code.  Section 4401 is certainly a provision dealing with taxation; it 
imposes a tax.  However, the word “taxation” was removed in Committee.96  The 
word “taxation” was replaced by the parenthetical phrase which contained the 
reference to Chapter 35 and other sections. 
Finally, Judge Dyk could not agree with the purpose of § 2719(d)(1), as 
construed by the Little Six, Inc. panel.97  Simply put, a desire to “promote tribal 
economic development and self-sufficiency” should not be extended to grant 
additional benefits to the tribes.98  But the Court held that the statute did grant an 
                                                                
89Id. at 1384. 
90Id. 
91Id.  
92Id. 
93Little Six, Inc., 229 F.3d at 1384. 
94Id. at 1384-85. 
95H.R. 1920, 99th Cong. § 4 (1986). 
96See Little Six, Inc., 229 F.3d at 1385.   
97Id. 
98Id. at 1385-86. 
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additional benefit, and that benefit was an exemption from these wagering and 
occupational taxes. 
The government has since filed a petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  Because the Court granted the petition in Chickasaw Nation,99 there seems to 
be no reason for the Court not to also grant this petition and consolidate the cases.   
D.  The Indian Canon of Construction and Relations with the Federal Government 
The Indian Canon of Construction is necessary because Indian law is full of 
ambiguity.  Specifically, the canon arose because of the ambiguous language used in 
treaties made between the United States government and tribes in the early days of 
the nation.100  Most of the treaties between Indians and the federal government are 
over a hundred years old, so they do not speak in modern terms.  The premise of the 
canon was articulated by Chief Justice John Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia101 
when he stated that the “language used in treaties with the Indians should never be 
construed to their prejudice.”102  This idea has been extended to require that 
ambiguous statutes, executive orders, and regulations be resolved in favor of 
Indians.103   
The reasons for the canon are many, and in spite of its extension to other forms of 
law, a full understanding of the canon cannot be reached without looking at it in the 
context of the early treaties made between the federal government and the Indians.  
As white settlers moved to the west, treaties were used to remove the Indian tribes 
out of the path of advancement.104   The Indians had little, if any, bargaining position, 
and the results of the negotiations were almost always unsatisfactory to them.105  
Additionally, many tribes had to deal with a language barrier at the treaty 
negotiations.  The treaties were always written in English, which was a very 
unfamiliar language to most Indians, so it was almost a guarantee that semantic and 
interpretational problems would arise.106 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia107 is another important Indian law case authored by 
Chief Justice Marshall because it laid out a number of principles that are still at the 
                                                                
9969 U.S.L.W. 3269 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2001) (No. 00-507). 
100See Erik M. Jensen, American Indian Law Meets the Internal Revenue Code:  Warbus v. 
Commissioner, 74 N.D. L. REV. 691, 695 (1998). 
10131 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
102Id. at 582. 
103See Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty 
Abogation:  “As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth” – How Long a Time 
Is That?, 63 CAL. L. REV. 601, 615 (1974). 
104Id. at 609. 
105
 Id. at 610.   
106Id. 
10730 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (In Cherokee Nation, the tribe attempted to invoke original 
jurisdiction in the United States Supreme Court by describing itself as a foreign nation.  The 
Court rejected that assertion, and Chief Justice Marshall set out those principles concerning 
the relationship between the Indians and the government in his opinion.).  
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core of the relationship between Indians and the federal government.108  Marshall 
found that Indian tribes are “domestic dependent nations.”109  The tribes “look to our 
government for protection,” resulting in a relationship between the government and 
the Indians “resembl[ing] that of a ward to his guardian.”110  The courts have since 
expanded this notion of the trust relationship set forth by Marshall, extending it to 
statutes, executive orders, and regulations.111  
The canon is now a well established principle of law, although many scholars, 
especially tax experts, are not aware of it.112  This canon does not come up frequently 
in tax law, but when it does, some confusion in applying the canon in the context of 
tax law can take place; hence the conflicting results in Chickasaw Nation and Little 
Six, Inc. 
III.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE TAXABILITY OF INDIAN TRIBES AND PRIOR COLLISIONS 
BETWEEN THE IRC AND THE INDIAN CANON OF CONSTRUCTION 
A.  The Taxability of Indian Tribes in General 
The taxation of Indian tribes under the Internal Revenue Code has traditionally 
been an issue that has puzzled both tax and Indian law scholars.  The unique position 
of tribes in our society has contributed to this.  Indian tribes are distinct, independent 
political entities and exert sovereignty over their land.113  In fact, because of this 
sovereign status, states cannot tax tribes or activities conducted on reservations.114  
The tribes elect political officers who enact civil and criminal laws administered by 
tribal courts, and they hold title to tribal land.115  Tribes are subject to the ultimate 
sovereignty of the federal government, and tribal members are United States 
citizens.116  These qualities are similar to those inherent in states.  Yet, Indian tribes 
are not states or subdivisions thereof, but rather “domestic dependent nations.”117  
Tribes are distinguishable from state governments because “the right of tribal self-
government is ultimately dependent on and subject to the broad power of 
Congress.”118  Therefore, unlike states, tribes are unable to claim rights against the 
federal government through the traditions and constitutional structures supporting the 
                                                                
108Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 103, at 613. 
109Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17. 
110Id. 
111Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 103, at 614-15. 
112Jensen, supra note 100. 
113Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 103, at 604. 
114Ellen P. Aprill, Tribal Bonds: Indian Sovereignty and the Tax Legislative Process, 46 
ADMIN. L. REV. 333, 334 (1994). 
115Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians:  Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 
132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 197 (1984). 
116Id. 
117See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 15-18. 
118White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980). 
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federalist system.119  The status of tribes does not conveniently fit into the 
Constitution’s traditional power allocation rules.120 
As a result, the treatment of Indian tribes in tax law has been rather ineffective 
and inconsistent.121  Before the Tribal Tax Act of 1982, the Internal Revenue Service 
was in charge of determining the tax treatment of tribal governments.122  Revenue 
Ruling 67-284123 declared that “[i]ncome tax statutes do not tax Indian tribes.  The 
tribe is not a taxable entity.”124  This ruling was interesting because it gave no 
analysis or basis for its conclusion, nor did it cite any statutory authority.125  That 
ruling, however, dealt primarily with the federal income tax treatment of income 
paid to or on behalf of enrolled members of Tribes.126  Why the Service made such a 
broad statement about the taxability of tribes is unknown. 
Subsequent litigation, unlike Revenue Ruling 67-284, drew on parallels between 
tribal governments and state and local governments.127  After all, tribal governments 
do have inherent powers and attributes of sovereignty,128 just as states do.  But unlike 
the states, the federal government has taken on a special responsibility toward tribal 
governments.  The federal government has developed a fiduciary obligation to the 
tribal governments and has announced a policy of encouraging economic 
development and self-sufficiency for tribes and their members.129  And Congress is 
free to use any available means, including the tax code, to assist in furthering these 
policies.   
The IRS, however, refused to treat the tribes as political subdivisions, thereby 
refusing to extend a variety of tax preferences enjoyed by state and local 
governments that were not enjoyed by the tribes.  In Revenue Ruling 68-231,130 the 
IRS concluded that the interest on debt of tribal governments was not eligible for the 
                                                                
119Newton, supra note 115, at 197. 
120Id. at 196. 
121Aprill, supra note 114, at 334. 
122Id. at 337. 
1231967-2 C.B. 55. 
124Id. at 58. 
125Aprill, supra note 114, at 337.  The ruling also did not support the conclusion with a 
policy analysis.  The IRS did not even indicate what kind of entity the tribal government was, 
it just concluded that the tribe is not a taxable entity.  See id. 
126See 1967-2 C.B. at 56.  The ruling went on to state that amounts paid to tribal council 
members or officers are subject to income tax, and that tribal income not otherwise exempt 
from Federal Income tax is includable in the gross income of the Indian tribal member when 
distributed or constructively received by him.  Id.   
127See Aprill, supra note 114, at 338. 
128See id. at 334. 
129See id. at 334-35. 
1301968-1 C.B. 48. 
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exclusion from income tax provided by § 103 of the Code.131  The ruling stated that a 
tribe “is not a division of the State, and since it exercises its governing powers by 
virtue of Federal, rather than State authority, the bonds in question are not issued on 
behalf the State within the meaning of the regulations under section 103(a).”132 
Another tax dilemma arises in the treatment of business corporations owned by 
tribes.  Little Six, Inc. is actually a wholly owned corporation of a tribe in South 
Dakota,133  but that was not the difference between the Chickasaw Nation and Little 
Six, Inc. results.  Granted, a literal reading of the Code would tax tribal corporations 
the same as any other corporation, but Revenue Ruling 81-295134 stated that the 
corporation is coextensive with the tribe itself, so it shared the exempt status of the 
tribe for income earned on the reservation.135  The IRS applied a policy analysis in 
this ruling, stating that “the political entity embodied in the concept of an Indian tribe 
has been recognized.”  The IRS then cited Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,136 to 
support the proposition that no income tax liability has been asserted against a tribe 
with respect to tribal income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the 
reservation.137   
In 1982, Congress finally weighed in on the matter by passing the Indian Tribal 
Governmental Tax Status Act, which is frequently referred to as the “Tribal Tax 
Act” and codified as § 7871 of the Internal Revenue Code.138  Essentially, the Tribal 
Tax Act treats tribal governments in the same way in which state governments are 
treated under certain provisions of the Code.  Most significantly, it grants tribes the 
benefits of § 103139 as long as the proceeds from the debt obligations issued by the 
tribal government are to be used for essential government functions.140  Also 
                                                                
131See I.R.C. § 103(c)(1) (2000).  This section allows the holder of a bond issued by a state 
or local government to exclude interest earned on that bond from gross income on his or her 
tax return.  The benefit for the government is that it can pay a lower interest rate on the debt 
than a taxable entity would while giving the same net return to the investor.  Thus, the 
government’s cost of capital is reduced. 
1321968-1 C.B. at 49-50. 
133See Little Six, Inc., 210 F.3d at 1362. 
1341981-2 C.B. 15. 
135Id. at 16 (In this ruling, the IRS concluded that a federally chartered tribal corporation 
was not taxable on income derived from the corporation’s income-producing activities, 
including a catfish hatchery and an annual tribal fair.). 
136411 U.S. 145 (1973) (holding that a provision in the Indian Reorganization Act barred a 
use tax that the state sought to impose on personal property purchased out of state and 
installed as a permanent improvement on the reservation). 
137See 1981-2 C.B. at 16. 
138Pub. L. No. 100-203, ch. 80, 96 Stat. 2607 (1982). 
139See I.R.C. § 7871(a)(4) (2000). 
140See I.R.C. § 7871(c).  This restriction is a major difference between a state’s ability to 
raise money with the benefits of § 103 and a tribe’s ability to raise money with the benefits of 
§ 103.  Section 7871(c) does not cover “passive activity bonds,” (PABs) which are issued by 
many states or their agencies for use by or on behalf of private businesses.  State and local 
governments frequently use PABs for economic development; for example, a regional sewer 
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included is an exemption from a number of excise taxes.141  Not included in this list 
are the taxes imposed under Chapter 35 of the Code.  Of course, if Congress did 
include that chapter, Chickasaw Nation and Little Six, Inc. would have been very 
easy cases because § 7871 would clearly exempt the tribes from the taxes imposed 
by Chapter 35.   
Why did § 7871 not include Chapter 35?  It was not necessary at that point in 
time.  Section 7871 was enacted in 1982, but the IGRA was not enacted until 1988.  
The IGRA was enacted in large part, if not entirely, as a reaction to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Cabazon Band, decided in 1987.  Additionally, Indian gaming 
was a relatively small industry when § 7871 was enacted.  The first reservation bingo 
hall was opened by the Seminole Tribe of Florida in 1979,142 so the industry was 
young and apparently not a concern of Congress at the time the Tribal Tax Act was 
passed.  So what may not have seemed necessary in 1982 was considered important 
enough to warrant a comprehensive congressional act just six years later. 
But why does all of this matter?  Section 2719(d)(1) of the IGRA requires that 
certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code apply to Indian gaming operations in 
the same manner as they do to state gaming operations.143  In effect, the statute 
extended the reach of the Tribal Tax Act to other provisions of the Internal Revenue 
Code which deal with the tax provisions of gambling activities.  The dispute in 
Chickasaw Nation and Little Six, Inc. was how many of those provisions were 
covered by § 2719(d)(1) of the IGRA. 
B.  Warbus v. Commissioner and Its Possible Effects on Tribal Taxation 
In Warbus v. Commissioner,144 an individual Indian taxpayer claimed an 
exemption from tax on debt discharge income because the income was derived from 
an Indian fishing-rights-related activity.145 Income from an Indian fishing-rights-
related activity is expressly exempted from taxation under § 7873(a) of the Code.146  
The taxpayer had borrowed money to buy a fishing boat, which he operated in 
fishing-rights-related activities of his nation.  After falling behind on his loan 
payments, the taxpayer’s boat was repossessed and the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
                                                          
district can issue PABs to build a sewage plant that will then be privately managed.  Original 
versions of the bill that became § 7871(c) did not include this restriction, but the change was 
made when objections were voiced by Representative Gibbons of Florida, who was apparently 
concerned that tribes would use PABs to fund the construction of tribal bingo halls.  See 
Aprill, supra note 114, at 341-47. 
141See I.R.C. §7871(a)(2) (2000).  The tribes were treated as a state for the purposes of any 
exemption from excise taxes imposed by Chapter 31 (relating to tax on special fuels), Chapter 
32 (relating to manufacturers excise taxes), Subchapter B of Chapter 33 (relating to 
communications excise tax), and subchapter 36 (relating to tax on the use of certain highway 
vehicles). 
142Cynthia A. De Silva, Wagering the Wager War:  Tribal Sovereignty, Tribal Gaming, 
and California’s Proposition 5 and Chapter 409, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1025, 1048 (1999). 
143See 25 U.S.C. 2719(d)(1). 
144110 T.C. 279 (1998). 
145Id. at 280. 
146See I.R.C. § 7873(a) (2000). 
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(BIA), which had guaranteed the loan, paid the lenders the shortage.147  As a result of 
this transaction, the taxpayer had income from the discharge of indebtedness.  Such 
income is normally includable in a taxpayer’s gross income.148  The taxpayer claimed 
an exemption from the inclusion of this income because it was derived by an Indian 
from the exercise of fishing rights.   
The Tax Court disagreed with Warbus.  It found that the income from the 
discharge of debt was not “directly related” to the harvesting, processing, 
transporting, or selling of fish in the exercise of recognized fishing rights of an 
Indian tribe, as the statute requires.149  Instead, the court found that this income was 
derived from the freeing of his assets from obligations by the BIA.150  The Tax Court 
seemed to put strong emphasis on the important tax concept that if Congress intends 
to exempt certain income, it must do so expressly.151  The statute did not expressly 
include a discharge of indebtedness from the loan used to purchase a boat used in a 
fishing rights-related activity, so the Tax Court did not find the income to be 
excludable.  Interestingly, the Indian Canon of Construction (hereinafter Canon) was 
never mentioned in that decision, although there seemed to be some ambiguity in the 
statute.  
While the decision did not generate a large amount of attention, it did catch the 
eye of Professor Erik M. Jensen, who wrote an article on the case soon after it was 
decided.152  He believed that the case was wrongly decided for two reasons.  First, 
there seemed to be no awareness of Indian law principles.153  This probably was not 
the Tax Court’s fault.  After all, there is no particular reason for Tax Court judges to 
be aware of Indian law canon.154  It did not help that none of the briefs, not even the 
one for Warbus, contained any hint of the existence of the Canon.155  Even so, this 
cannot be an excuse, because the Canon is a part of the law and judges are obligated 
to follow it.156  However, judges can and do avoid application of the Canon simply 
by purporting to find no ambiguity in the language that is being construed, even 
though the language may be inherently ambiguous.157  That did not happen in 
Warbus, but it is always unacceptable to ignore the Canon, even if the court is not 
made aware of them. 
                                                                
147See Warbus, 110 T.C. at 280-81. 
148See I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (2000) (explicitly stating that income from the discharge of 
indebtedness is includable in a taxpayer’s gross income). 
149Warbus, 110 T.C. at 283. 
150Id. at 284. 
151Id. at 283. 
152Jensen, supra note 100. 
153Id. at 692. 
154Id. at 697. 
155Id. 
156Id. at 696. 
157Jensen, supra note 100, at 697. 
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Second, Professor Jensen argued that the court did not properly read § 7873, 
which resulted in an improper interpretation of the statute.158  Namely, the court’s 
interpretation of the word “activity” in § 7873 was inconsistent with its use 
elsewhere in the Code.159  Additionally, Professor Jensen did not feel that it would 
strain the statutory language to consider the debt-discharge income attributable to the 
foreclosure on a fishing boat as being directly related to a fishing rights-related 
activity.160  This is because income can be attributable to an “activity” even though a 
particular taxpayer’s efforts in the activity are minimal or nonexistent.161  The details 
and analysis of § 7873 are not important for the analysis of Chickasaw Nation and 
Little Six, Inc.  However, the Warbus case and Professor Jensen’s analysis of it are 
important because they demonstrate some of the interpretational mistakes that seem 
to have been made by the court in Chickasaw Nation. 
C.  Why Courts Often Have Trouble When Tax Law and Indian Law Collide 
Already mentioned is one of the main reasons why the courts often have trouble 
synthesizing the Code and the Canon – few tax scholars and practitioners know 
much about Indian law, and few Indian law experts know much about tax law.  In 
Warbus, it seemed that little effort was made to get the necessary Indian law issues 
on the table – even by Warbus, the person who would benefit from their 
application.162  In fact, the Canon is not even mentioned in the opinion.  That was in 
spite of a long discussion about just what a “directly-related fishing activity” is (or as 
it turned out, what is not).  If Warbus had argued that the statute was ambiguous, 
perhaps this would have created enough of a problem that the court would have felt 
obliged to consider the Canon and rule in his favor.  Professor Jensen thinks that the 
use of the Canon should have made Warbus a sure winner in the case.163 
IV.  WHAT’S THE RIGHT ANSWER IN CHICKASAW NATION AND LITTLE SIX? 
A.  A Closer Look at Section 2719(d)(1) of the IGRA 
Clearly, the interpretation of § 2719(d)(1) was the major area of disagreement 
between the Chickasaw Nation and Little Six, Inc. courts.  This statute was what both 
tribes used to claim an exemption.  Again, the text of the statute reads:   
The provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (including sections 
1441, 3402(q), 6041, and 6050I, and Chapter 35 of such Code) concerning 
the reporting and withholding of taxes with respect to the winnings from 
gaming or wagering operations shall apply to Indian gaming operations 
conducted pursuant to this chapter, or under a Tribal-State compact 
entered into under section 2710(d)(3) of this title that is in effect, in the 
                                                                
158Id. at 692. 
159Id. at 702. 
160Id. at 705. 
161Id. at 704-05. 
162Jensen, supra note 100, at 697. 
163Id. at 695. 
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same manner as such provisions apply to State gaming and wagering 
operations.164   
So, the statute requires that certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, 
“including” those which are set out in the parenthetical, concerning the “reporting 
and withholding of taxes with respect to the winnings from gaming or wagering 
operations,” are to apply to Indian gaming operations in the same manner as they 
apply to state gaming and wagering operations. 
In analyzing § 2719(d)(1), a good starting point is to look at the sections listed in 
the statute’s parenthetical to determine what taxes and/or requirements those sections 
impose.  Already discussed is the fact that Chapter 35 deals with taxes on wagering, 
and is the home of § 4401, which imposes the wagering excise tax, and § 4402, 
which grants the exemption for state-conducted lotteries.165  Chapter 35 also includes 
the occupational tax in § 4411, which is paid by those liable for the tax imposed in § 
4401.166  Overall, Chapter 35 covers § 4401 to § 4424.  However, nothing in that 
chapter mentions the winnings of players.  The chapter imposes the excise tax,167 the 
occupational tax imposed on those who pay the excise tax,168 miscellaneous 
provisions which deal with the definitions of “wager” and “lottery,”169 the 
applicability of state laws,170 and disclosure provisions.171  Just by reading Chapter 
35, the problem in § 2719(d)(1) becomes obvious: it talks about the “reporting and 
withholding taxes with respect to the winnings from gaming or wagering 
operations,” but the parenthetical’s reference to Chapter 35 does not seem to fit 
there. This is because Chapter 35 has nothing to do with the winnings from gaming 
or wagering operations.  The reference to Chapter 35 seems unnecessary, at least 
when looking at the language outside the parenthetical.  So perhaps looking at the 
other sections in the parenthetical in § 2719(d)(1) of the IGRA may provide a better 
idea as to what Congress was attempting to do in that statute. 
Section 1441 of the Code is titled “Withholding on tax of nonresident aliens.”172  
Essentially, this section requires persons having the control of the disposal or 
payment of any items of income to any nonresident alien or foreign partnership to 
withhold a tax of either thirty or fourteen percent (depending upon the type of 
income) of the disbursement.173  Some gambling winnings, however, are exempted 
from this withholding.174 
                                                                
16425 U.S.C. § 2719(d)(1). 
165See I.R.C. § 4402(3). 
166See id. § 4411. 
167See id. §§ 4401-05. 
168See id. §§ 4411-14. 
169See id. § 4421. 
170See I.R.C. § 4422. 
171See id. §§ 4423-24. 
172See id. § 1441. 
173See id. § 1441(a). 
174See id. § 1441(c)(11). 
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The inclusion of this section seems to make sense in the statute.  It clearly gives 
instructions as to the withholding of taxes (or, in this case, the exception) from 
gambling winnings.   
Section 3402(q) also relates to the withholding of certain gambling winnings.  It 
requires any person making a payment of gambling winnings to withhold a twenty-
eight percent tax from such payment.175  Again, there are exceptions,176 including 
§ 3402(q)(3)(B), which states that the winnings from state conducted lotteries are 
subject to withholding only to the extent that they exceed $5,000.177  Obviously, the 
reference to this section in the parenthetical makes sense, because it deals with the 
withholding of gambling winnings.  The statute even contains language specific to 
state-conducted lotteries.  Therefore, that language, as a result of § 2719(d)(1) of the 
IGRA, will control the manner in which the statute is supposed to be applied to 
Indian gaming. 
Section 6041 of the Code requires all persons in a trade or business who make 
payments to another person of $600 or more to prepare a return stating the amount of 
any gains, profits, and income of the recipients of such payments.178  It seems fairly 
easy to figure out that the purpose of this statute is to make sure that persons who 
receive large amounts of money are properly reporting them as income on their tax 
returns at the end of the year.  This would include big winners in gambling, state-
conducted or otherwise.  Clearly, this would be a reporting requirement for the 
winnings of gamblers at Indian-run establishments.  Therefore, the inclusion of this 
code section in the parenthetical in § 2719(d)(1) seems logical. 
Finally, § 6050I requires anyone engaged in a trade or business who receives 
more than $10,000 in one or more related transactions to file an informational return 
with the IRS concerning certain details behind such transactions.179  That information 
includes data about the person from whom the cash was received, the amount of cash 
received, and the date and nature of the transaction.180  The statute does have 
exceptions, but they only involve financial institutions and transactions occurring 
outside the United States.181  The purpose of this rule should be fairly obvious.  It can 
detect money laundering schemes182 and identify parties with large cash incomes 
who may be underreporting income by spending large amounts of cash.183  But, like 
Chapter 35 of the Code, what is lacking in § 6050I is a reference to winnings from 
gambling, be it state-conducted or not.  Again, it is hard to see the connection 
between the inclusion of § 6050I of the Code in the § 2719(d)(1) parenthetical and 
                                                                
175See I.R.C. § 3402(q)(1) (2000). 
176See id. § 3402(q)(2). 
177See id. § 3402(q)(3)(B). 
178See id. § 6041(a). 
179See id. § 6050I(a). 
180See I.R.C. § 6050I(b). 
181See id. § 6050I(c). 
182See Bickham Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. U.S., 168 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 1999). 
183See U.S. v. Casablanca Motors, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 50 (D. P.R. 1994). 
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the language outside the parenthetical.  Not surprisingly, the Little Six, Inc. court also 
made reference to this section in concluding that § 2719(d)(1) is ambiguous.184 
It should be kept in mind that the exemption granted in § 2719(d)(1) applies to all 
forms of Indian gaming.  It is hard to imagine anyone spending $10,000 in just pull-
tabs.  Therefore, the inclusion of § 6050I in the IGRA was apparently placed there to 
exempt the operators of Indian casinos from having to prepare returns for big-money 
gamblers. 
But what is interesting in the context of § 2719(d)(1) is that § 6050I does not 
create an exception for state-conducted lotteries, and there is probably no reason to 
do it.  Since people buy lottery tickets in amounts of far less than $10,000, and since 
the sales are made in cash, tracking down anyone who spends $10,000 in a year 
would be almost impossible.  On the other hand, a lot of money can change hands in 
a short amount of time at a casino.  One can cash a check for $10,000 worth of chips 
right on the spot.185  An Indian casino, save for this provision, would have to report 
large transactions like this.  But the relation to state gaming operations is mysterious.  
The Little Six, Inc. court thought that the reference to § 6050I, as well as the 
reference to Chapter 35, was superfluous because neither of them relate to 
“winnings.”186 
What is left after looking at the parenthetical in § 2719(d)(1)?  Of the five 
sections (actually, four sections and one chapter) mentioned in the parenthetical, two 
of them have nothing to do with the reporting or withholding of winnings.  
Obviously, this is an unusual situation.  Usually a parenthetical such as the one in 
§ 2719(d)(1) is put there in order to clarify the statute.  Here, the parenthetical only 
makes the statute more confusing.  In fact, much of the language in the statute is 
superfluous.  So it seems that the Little Six, Inc. court was right.  The statute is 
ambiguous or at the very least, it is confusing and very poorly written. 
This results in an all too familiar question: “What was Congress really trying to 
do?”  Did it only want the provisions of the Code concerning the reporting and 
withholding of taxes with respect to the winnings from gaming to apply to the 
Indians in the same manner as they apply to state lotteries?  That would seem to be 
the case if that parenthetical phrase was taken out.  Taking out the parenthetical 
would make the statute fairly clear, at least as far as the taxes imposed by Chapter 35 
are concerned.  Since § 2719(d)(1) would only reach provisions of the Code related 
to the reporting and withholding of taxes with respect to the winnings from gaming, 
the taxes imposed by Chapter 35, which do not relate to any of those things, would 
not be affected by the statute.  Therefore, the argument for an exemption similar to 
the one enjoyed by state-operated lotteries would be gone.  As a result, the tribes 
would clearly be liable for these taxes. 
But the parenthetical has to have been put in there for a reason.  It could be that 
Congress wanted the provisions of the Code sections in the parenthetical to apply to 
Indian gaming in the same manner as they do to state lotteries.  Since state lotteries 
                                                                
184See Little Six, Inc., 210 F.3d at 1365. 
185That brings to mind the famous debt-discharge case of Zarin v. Commissioner, 916 F.2d 
110 (3d Cir. 1990), where the taxpayer, in one month, accumulated a debt to the casino of 
nearly $3.5 million, which was mainly the result of bounced personal checks.   
186See Little Six, Inc., 210 F.3d at 1365. 
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are exempted from Chapter 35’s taxes,187 the tribes would be exempt from these 
taxes, as well.  But the question of why the language of the statute only mentions 
“the reporting and withholding of taxes with respect to winnings” is still not 
answered.  
The legislative history does not help much, either.  On one hand, the word 
“taxation” was removed from the original version of the statute, as Judge Dyk 
mentioned.188  On the other hand, one of the statute’s authors stated that Congress 
really meant to treat the taxation of wagers conducted by the Indians in the same 
manner as wagers conducted by states.189  The fact that this was stated by one of the 
statute’s drafters should entitle it to more weight than the Chickasaw Nation court 
was willing to give to it, in spite of the fact that it was made long after the fact and 
only represents the voice of one senator.190  In the end, there is still no clear answer.  
The statute is ambiguous. 
B.  Further Analysis of the Ambiguous Statute 
At this point, after concluding that the § 2719(d)(1) is ambiguous, it would seem 
easy to just use the Indian Canon of Construction to settle the matter in favor of the 
tribes.  If this happens, the interpretation of the statute must be resolved in favor of 
the tribes, who would then get the exemption from the tax in § 4401.  That is what 
the Little Six court did, much to the chagrin of Judge Dyk in his dissent on the 
petitions for rehearing.191  However, doing this would ignore another important tax 
concept.  This is the rule that absent clear statutory guidance, a court will not imply 
tax exemptions. 
The rule that tax exemptions are not granted by implication is applicable to 
taxing statutes affecting Indians as it is to all others.192  If Congress intends to exempt 
certain income, it must do so expressly.193  Courts are particularly sensitive to 
interpreting statutes to include exemptions when the Indians in the case argue that it 
should be a matter of policy.  If courts could create or imply tax exemptions based on 
policy, many of the federal Indian laws would have the unintended effect of 
                                                                
187See I.R.C. § 4402(3). 
188See Little Six, Inc., 229 F.3d at 1385. 
189See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 883. 
190In their article, Wilkinson and Volkman discuss a hierarchy or reliability of legislative 
history.  The hierarchy indicates that statements made by sponsors of legislation can “be 
persuasive on some occasions.”  Wilkinson, supra note 101, at 635.  While this type of 
statement is usually made in debate, the statement by Senator Inuuye after the fact is still 
deserving of some weight.  Of course, they point out in their hierarchy that a specific reference 
in the enactment itself is the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.  The fact that there is 
a reference to Chapter 35 would seem to work in favor of the tribes.  Of course, the other 
language of § 2719(d)(1) confuses the issue. 
191See Little Six, Inc., 229 F.3d at 1384. 
192Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside, 442 F.2d 1184, 1187 
(9th Cir. 1971). 
193See Warbus, 110 T.C. at 282-83. 
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exempting Indians from almost all taxation.194  As the Court in Confederated Tribes 
of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon v. Kurtz195 stated: 
It is one thing to say that courts should construe treaties and statute 
dealing with Indians liberally, and quite another to say that, based on 
those same policy considerations which prompted the canon of liberal 
construction, courts themselves are free to create favorable rules.196 
The court went on to say that an exemption from a treaty or non-tax statute can be 
found only where there is “express exemptive language.”197 
This discussion illustrates what the real conflict in Chickasaw Nation and Little 
Six, Inc. really is (or should be).  There is a statute, § 2719(d)(1) of the IGRA, which 
is ambiguous as to whether it grants the tribes an exemption from the wagering taxes 
levied by § 4401 of the Internal Revenue Code, as well as the occupational tax in 
§ 4411.  On one side, the Indian Canon of Construction says that since the statute is 
ambiguous, it must be interpreted in favor of the Indians, so the exemption in this 
case should be granted.  On the other side, there is a rule of tax law which says that 
tax exemptions must be clearly granted, which would mean that the exemption 
should not be granted here because there is no “express exemptive language,” as the 
Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon court put it.  Quite simply, the question is 
which of these two rules should prevail. 
The Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon court, while not really dealing with 
that question because it did not think that the statutes were ambiguous,198 seemed to 
lean towards favoring the exemption rule.  While it did briefly mention the Indian 
Canon of Construction, it spent a considerably longer amount of time, and cited more 
cases, discussing the exemption rule.  It also repeatedly used the phrase “express 
exemptive language” while trying to find a provision to jusstify an exemption.   
So then, did the Little Six, Inc. court freely create a favorable rule, as the Warm 
Springs Reservation of Oregon court would put it, or did it simply construe an 
ambiguous statute in favor of the Indians? 
It is more likely that it did the latter.  It did not create an exemption to the tax 
laws.  Congress was clearly trying to create some type of exemptions in 
§ 2719(d)(1).  The problem is that the language used – or maybe more exactly, a 
parenthetical trying to explain the language that was used – made it unclear just what 
Congress was trying to exempt.  Such poor drafting is certainly not the fault of the 
                                                                
194United States v. Anderson, 625 F.2d 910, 917 (9th Cir. 1980). 
195691 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1982).  In Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon, a tribe was 
suing the government for the return of excise taxes paid from the use of motor vehicles and 
manufacturing.  Id. at 879.  The tribe claimed that a number of relevant statutes were 
ambiguous and that they should be construed in favor of the tribes under the Indian Canon of 
Construction to find an exemption.  Id. at 880-81.  The court found no ambiguity in the 
statutes, so the tribe was denied an exemption.  Id. at 881.  The Warm Springs Reservation of 
Oregon, court also spent a good deal of time discussing the reasons why the court could not 
imply an exemption.  See id. at 880-83. 
196Id. at 882-83, quoting Fry v. United States, 557 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1977). 
197See Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon, 691 F.2d at 882-83. 
198See id. at 881. 
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Indians, so why should they bear the burden?  That is what the Indian Canon of 
Construction does – it ensures that the law errs on the side of the protection of 
Indians when the language used by a treaty, statute, or regulation is unclear.  The 
Little Six, Inc. court recognized the significance of the Canon, while the Chickasaw 
Nation court apparently did not. 
That is not to say that the Little Six, Inc. analysis is perfect.  Judge Dyk raised 
some valid questions when he dissented from the Federal Circuit’s denial of the 
petitions for rehearing.  Still, his analysis does support the assertion that § 2719(d)(1) 
is ambiguous.  He acknowledges that one cannot give effect to all the language of the 
statute without rendering the statute self-contradictory.199  While he was right that the 
Little Six, Inc. court should have engaged in more analysis of the statute’s structure, 
purpose, and history to produce an interpretation that makes the statute coherent,200 it 
seems that even doing so would not produce a clear answer.  If, after doing more 
work than the Little Six, Inc. court did, the statute’s meaning was still unclear, as it 
appears to be, then the Canon should be used to resolve the matter in favor of the 
Indians.   
C.  Where Did Chickasaw Nation Go Wrong? 
So, now that the analysis indicates that the Little Six, Inc. decision is right, it 
should be noted where the Chickasaw Nation court seemed to err in its analysis.  
First, it seems that the court in Chickasaw Nation made many of the same mistakes 
in its decision that Professor Jensen thinks the Tax Court made in Warbus. 
A very important factor is that there must be concerns in the precedential value of 
each of these decisions.  In the introduction to his paper, Professor Jensen stated a 
concern that the Warbus decision could become extremely bad precedent, as it was a 
published decision of the Tax Court.201  Specifically, he worried that the decision 
could come to stand for the proposition that the Tax Court could ignore Indian law 
principles in tax disputes that involve Indian tribes or Indian tribal members.202  The 
same thing almost happened with Chickasaw Nation.  Section 7873 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, the section which was in dispute in Warbus, had not been the subject 
of prior judicial decisions, so the erroneous decision in Warbus could have an 
enormous effect in developing an understanding of that section.203  Similarly, 
§ 2719(d)(1) of the IGRA had not been the subject of judicial scrutiny before 
Chickasaw Nation and Little Six, Inc.  Had both courts come to the same conclusion 
on the meaning of the statute, that understanding would have been firmly 
established.  And if Little Six, Inc. had followed the interpretation of Chickasaw 
Nation, the interpretation against the tribes would have two decisions in its favor.  
This could be particularly troubling because, like § 7873 in Warbus, § 2719(d)(1) is 
specifically geared toward the tax consequences of Indian activity.  This should be 
obvious because § 2719(d)(1) is in Title 25 of the United States Code, which is the 
body of Federal Indian law.  And a case involving § 2719(d)(1) will never come up 
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202Id. 
203Id. at 692. 
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outside the context of Indian law, so there would probably be fewer opportunities for 
courts to take a look at this statute and analyze the errors of Chickasaw Nation.   
Additionally, both Warbus and Chickasaw Nation demonstrate how judges can 
all but disregard the Indian Canon of Construction when its application seems to be 
inconvenient.  Judges have, on a number of occasions, circumvented the Canon by 
simply declaring that the statute is unambiguous.204  Yet they have to acknowledge 
the Canon; it is a part of the law.205  But of course, if the statute is not ambiguous, 
then the Canon is not a concern.  How the Chickasaw Nation court found no 
ambiguity in the statute is still difficult to understand.  The analysis above describes 
how and why § 2719(d)(1) is ambiguous.  The Chickasaw Nation opinion couldn’t 
explain what the language of the statute means, although it purported to do so.  
Because the court thought it knew what the statute meant, it did not concern itself 
with the Canon. 
For example, rather than break down the statute into smaller pieces, the 
Chickasaw Nation court looked at the statute in a very broad sense.206  It spent most 
of its time concentrating on policy-driven arguments, which are important in their 
own way.  But the policy of the IGRA is in § 2702; the statute at issue in the case 
was § 2719(d)(1).  Before looking at the somewhat fuzzy policy objectives, the Court 
should have spent more time analyzing the statute itself to try to determine what the 
statute meant. 
Particularly odd is the Court’s handling of the reference to Chapter 35 in the 
parenthetical of § 2719(d)(1).  It calls the statute’s reference to Chapter 35 
“somewhat cryptic,”207 but discards that problem by claiming that the most 
reasonable conclusion is that the reference to Chapter 35 was to incorporate its 
definitions of the terms “wager” and “lottery.”208  It is true that Chapter 35 does 
contain definitions for those terms, but they are both contained in one section, 
§ 4421.  Section 4421(1) defines “wager” and § 4421(2) defines “lottery.” The bulk 
of the remaining portions of Chapter 35 deal with the wagering excise tax and the 
related occupational tax.209  So, if Congress was really just trying to incorporate those 
two terms, why didn’t it just say “§ 4421” instead of “Chapter 35?”  The Court did 
not address that, and it probably does not have a good answer.  And besides, while 
§ 4421, does define “wager” and “lottery”, those terms, at least in the context of 
§ 4421, still have nothing to do with “the reporting and withholding of taxes with 
respect to the winnings from gaming operations.”210  So even if Congress was just 
trying to incorporate those definitions, a reference to § 4421 in place of “Chapter 35” 
would still be difficult to explain. 
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207Id. at 883. 
208Id. 
209See I.R.C. §§ 4401-14 (2000). 
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In fact, later in the same paragraph as this Chapter 35 explanation, the Court 
seems to unwittingly acknowledge that the § 2719(d)(1) is ambiguous.  This passage 
near the end of the opinion seems to acknowledge this ambiguity: 
In any event, we are unwilling to assume, based solely upon the inclusion 
of this parenthetical reference to Chapter 35, that Congress intended to 
provide tribes with the exemption from federal wagering excise taxes 
enjoyed by the states.  Such an assumption would fly directly in the face 
of § 2719(d)’s express reference to “the reporting and withholding of 
taxes with respect to the winnings from gaming or wagering 
operations.”211   
That passage, along with the reference to Chapter 35’s inclusion in the 
parenthetical being “somewhat cryptic,”212 makes it clear that the Court really had no 
idea what the reference to Chapter 35 was doing in the parenthetical.  It sees the 
conflict between the reference to Chapter 35 and the language outside the 
parenthetical.  But instead of taking this ambiguity and investigating it further, the 
Court simply made up its mind that, whatever all of this language meant, it could not 
have meant an exemption to the excise taxes in Chapter 35.  The Court simply stated 
that if Congress intended to provide tribes with an exemption from the federal 
wagering excise taxes, it clearly knew how to draft such an exemption.213  By doing 
this, the Canon was kept out of play.  Additionally, the Court did not consider other 
sections mentioned in the parenthetical, namely § 6050I, and failed to analyze its 
somewhat mysterious inclusion therein, as did the Little Six, Inc. Court.214   
But before going any farther, it is important to consider the original question 
posed in this section.  That is the one about the conflict between the Indian Canon of 
Construction and the reluctance of courts to imply a tax exemption from ambiguous 
statutes.  This is bound to come up again in the courts, so the question should be 
addressed.  Which one should prevail?  The Indian Canon of Construction should 
prevail. 
Unquestionably, the history behind the Indian Canon of Construction has to be a 
factor here.  By not giving Indians the benefit of the doubt on an ambiguous statute, 
it seems that courts would be ignoring the principles behind the government’s 
relationship with Indians.  The language used by the Supreme Court in a case where 
it had to construe ambiguous language in the context of Indian law and taxation, 
Squire v. Capoeman,215 probably states it best:  “To tax respondent under these 
circumstances would, in the words of the court below, be ‘at the least, a sorry breach 
                                                                
211Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 883. 
212Id. 
213See id. at 884. 
214See Little Six, Inc., 210 F.3d at 1365. 
215351 U.S. 1 (1956).  This case involved the taxation of an individual Indian.  The IRS 
claimed that the taxpayer owed capital gains taxes from the sale of timber on land acquired 
from the government pursuant to the General Allotment Act of 1887.  The Court used the 
Indian Canon of Construction to conclude that the transfer of the land “free of all charge or 
incumbrance whatsover” included capital gains from the sale of timber on the land.  Id. at 4. 
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of faith with these Indians.’”216  That faith with which the government should 
conduct its affairs with Indians is kept in check, in part, by the Indian Canon of 
Construction.  This Canon was a part of American jurisprudence long before the 
Internal Revenue Code came into being, and should not be ignored in tax cases.   
D.  Other Policy Concerns Which Support an Exemption 
Section 7871 of the Code forces the IRS to treat tribal governments in the same 
manner as it does state governments under certain sections of the Code.217  Why 
would Congress want to do this?  States have a number of essential government 
functions that have to be carried out, and of course, the taxpayers of the states are 
ultimately the people who pay for these services.  The exemptions from many tax 
provisions that are enjoyed by state governments are a way to save them money.  
The less money that states have to pay to the federal government, the less they have 
to take from their citizens in the form of taxes. 
The same is true for tribal governments.  Indian tribes exert sovereignty over 
their land, and like all governments, regulate conduct within the governmental (in 
their case, reservation) boundaries.218  In enacting § 7871, Congress recognized this 
and granted some (but obviously not all) of the tax advantages enjoyed by states to 
tribal governments.  The same policy applies as the one that justifies the provisions 
that are favorable to state governments.   
So why do tribes sell pull-tabs and open casinos?  It’s the same reason that states 
have lotteries:  they are usually cash cows.219  As an example, in 1999, the Ohio 
Lottery had sales of approximately $2.145 billion, with prize expenses, commissions, 
and operating expenses totaling approximately $1.483 billion.220  That is a profit of 
about $662 million dollars, all of it free of tax from the federal government.  Why 
should it be tax-free?  In 1999, $696 million was transferred to fund education, as 
required by the Ohio Constitution.221  Since its inception in 1974, the Lottery has 
provided over $9.7 billion in support of the state’s public education system.222 
Tribal governments are using the profits from their casinos and lotteries, 
including pull-tab games, for many of the same purposes.  For example, the Oneida 
Tribe in New York operates the Turning Stone Casino.223  It has used gaming 
revenues to purchase additional land, increasing the size of the reservation from 
                                                                
216Squire, 351 U.S. at 10. 
217See I.R.C. § 7871(a). 
218Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 103, at 604. 
219Although, as Rand and Light point out, not all Indian gaming operations are successful.  
It depends on a number of market variables, such as population density.  However, games such 
as the pull-tabs are set up so that the tribe will make money as it gets through each box of 
tickets.  Still, these are not the most lucrative gaming operation; the casinos are.  See Rand & 
Light, supra note 16, at 404-05. 
220Ohio Lottery Commission, Where the Money Goes, at http://www.ohiolottery.com/ 
where/where.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2001). 
221Ohio CONST., art. XV, § 6. 
222Ohio Lottery Commission, supra note 220. 
223See Rand & Light, supra note 16, at 403.   
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thirty-two acres to nearly 4,000 acres.224  It has also built a council house, health 
services center, senior center, new roads, and a burial ground.225  More in line with 
Ohio’s use of lottery money, the tribe has also established scholarship and job 
training programs.226  From this, can be seen that states and tribes use the proceeds 
from lotteries and other types of gambling for many, if not most, of the same 
purposes.   
Essentially, this makes it fair to treat states and tribes in a similar manner under 
any provision of the Internal Revenue Code.  It is a case of horizontal equity:  
similarly situated taxpayers should be treated in a similar manner by the tax laws.  
While there are differences between states and tribes, they are very similarly situated 
in the case of their gambling operations.  Both tribes and states run these operations 
because they are profitable.  Both use the proceeds for similar purposes, which 
ultimately serve the interests of the people within the boundaries of the state or 
reservation.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
As mentioned earlier, a petition for certiorari was granted on January 22, 2001 by 
the Supreme Court in the Chickasaw Nation case.  Hopefully, the Court will make a 
careful analysis of all of the statutes involved, especially § 2719(d)(1) of the IGRA.  
Also, it should not forget about the Indian Canon of Construction and the policies 
which make it only fair to treat tribal governments in the same manner as state 
governments.  With this in mind, hopefully the Court will find that § 2719(d)(1) 
should be construed to allow an exemption from the excise and occupational taxes 
for these tribes. 
Whatever the Court decides, Congress could eventually put an end to this mess 
by amending § 2719(d)(1) to make it clear whether these wagers are exempt.  
However, a review of legislation introduced since these decisions came out reveals 
that no one has proposed an amendment to § 2719(d)(1).  That is not surprising, 
since this is far from a hot-button issue for most Americans.  It is an issue that is 
unlikely to receive much attention in the near future, as both political parties will be 
concentrating on introducing legislation dealing with the main topics of last year’s 
election.  Still, it is better for tax issues to be resolved in places other than the courts.   
VI.  POSTSCRIPT:  THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION 
The Supreme Court ultimately decided this issue in Chickasaw Nation v. United 
States227 and in a 7-2 decision, ruled for the government. 
Justice Breyer wrote for the majority.  After reviewing the language of the 
statutes involved, the opinion agreed with the Tribes that the reference to Chapter 35 
was surplusage, but that the reference to Chapter 35 cannot be given independent 
operative effect without “seriously rewriting the language of the rest of the 
statute.”228  The opinion also emphasized the rule that when Congress enacts a tax 
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exemption, it usually does so explicitly.229  In this case, the Court stated that the 
“more plausible role” of the hypothetical was to provide an illustrative list of 
examples, and that the reference to Chapter 35 was simply a bad example which may 
have been included inadvertently.230  Again, the bad example did not warrant 
rewriting of the remainder of the statute’s language, nor did it mean that the statute 
was ambiguous, that is, “capable of being understood in two or more possible 
ways.”231  Instead, common sense suggests that this cross-reference is simply a 
drafting mistake, a failure to delete an inappropriate cross-reference in the bill that 
Congress later enacted into law.232 
The Court also discussed the legislative history of § 2719(d), specifically the 
deletion of the word “taxation” from the language of the statute.  The Court stated 
that the Tribes’ interpretation of the statute would bring the word “taxation” back 
into the language of the statute, even though it was deleted.233 
Finally, the Indian Canon of Construction was considered, and ultimately 
discarded, by the Court.  Accepting as conclusive the Indian Canon “would produce 
an interpretation that we conclude would conflict with the intent embodied in the 
statute Congress wrote,” so the Court refused to apply the canon in this case.234  The 
opinion also pointed out the canon that tax exemptions should be clearly expressed, 
and refused to compare the strength of the canons since the Indian Canon of 
Construction was inapplicable in this case.235 
Justice O’Connor, who was joined by Justice Souter, wrote the dissenting 
opinion.  Her argument was that even though there was some drafting error in the 
statute,236 there is simply no way to tell whether the error was the inclusion of 
“Chapter 35” in the parenthetical or the removal of the word “taxation” in the 
statute.237  She added that there is no generally accepted canon of statutory 
construction favoring language outside of parentheses to language within them.238  
As a result, it becomes necessary to turn to other canons of statutory construction.239  
She also noted the policy behind IGRA, which is to aid in tribes raising revenue, and 
noted that it would seem logical that Congress would have intended the Nations to 
receive more, not less, revenue from gaming.240  Because “[t]his Court has repeatedly 
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held that, when these two canons conflict, the Indian canon predominates,”241 the 
Court should rule in favor of the Indians.  She concluded by stating that this case 
“provides a persuasive case for application of the Indian canon” because the Court is 
only being asked to use the Indian canon as a tiebreaker between two equally 
plausible (or implausible) constructions of a troubled statute.242   
Justice O’Connor’s opinion does well in explaining why the statute cannot be 
unambiguous.  It would seem unnecessary that the Supreme Court would have to 
decide a case over excise taxes where the statute is unambiguous.  It would also 
seem likely that if the statute was unambiguous, the Court would be unanimous in its 
decision.  But, of course, this is not how the majority saw the issue, and without an 
ambiguous statute, the Indian Canon is not particularly useful.   
Now the wishes of the Tribes are in the hands of Congress.  If it really did intend 
to provide a tax exemption in this case, it needs to amend § 2719(d) to make this 
clear.  Justice O’Connor pointed out that such a result would comport with the stated 
purpose of IGRA, which is to “provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming 
by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic self-sufficiency, and strong 
tribal governments.”243  Hopefully, if this was indeed the intent of Congress, it will 
remember this policy and quickly act to fix the statute.   
 
JOHN BURGESS 
                                                                
241Id. 
242Chickasaw Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 539. 
243See  25 U.S.C. § 2702(1). 
31Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
